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DEWEY AT MANILA BAY
Lessons in Operational Art and Operational Leadership from
America’s First Fleet Admiral
Commander Derek B. Granger, U.S. Navy
On the night of 30 April 1898, the six-ship U.S. Asiatic Squadron, com-manded by Commodore George Dewey, steamed into Manila Bay in the
Spanish Philippines to do battle with the Spanish South Pacific Squadron. In less
than seven hours Dewey sank or captured the entire Spanish fleet and silenced
Manila’s shore batteries, all while suffering just eight wounded and without the
loss of a single American life.1 Dewey’s success in a distant bay most Americans
could not have pointed to on a map transformed the United States into a colo-
nial power, causing Europe to take note.2 An editorial in a German newspaper
observed that Dewey’s victory marked “a new epoch in history, not only for the
United States but likewise for Europe.”3
In light of the dramatic change to the world political landscape brought by Ma-
nila Bay, it is notable how little attention Dewey’s exploits receive today from stu-
dents of naval history. Perhaps the passage of 113 years since Dewey’s victory has
led historians to conclude that his accomplishments, though impressive for their
day, are irrelevant to students of operational art marked now by satellite surveil-
lance and cruise missiles. If that is the case, however, why should service colleges
pay attention to the accomplishments of Napoleon Bonaparte, Ferdinand Foch, or
Raymond Spruance? Are not their achievements little more than historical curios-
ities in an age of globalism, stealth technology, and smart weapons?
Worse, it would seem, Dewey—like most of his contemporaries (and many
naval leaders who followed him over the next half-century)—subscribed to an-
other historical curiosity, the Mahanian theory of engaging and decisively de-
feating the enemy battle fleet. His victory at Manila, in fact, was arguably a prime
example of Mahanian warfare. The subsequent discrediting of Mahanian tactics
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has rendered Dewey irrelevant to many students of modern naval warfare. Fur-
thermore, Dewey’s action against the Spanish at Manila Bay involved only six
fighting ships and so hardly represents the operational level of war at all using
more recent yardsticks. When compared to the forces commanded by Nimitz
and Spruance at Midway, Dewey’s was little more than a tactical detachment. In
this view, Dewey’s accomplishments are worthy of study only insomuch as they
demonstrate his thorough mastery of Mahanian tactics. Referring to the Ameri-
can victories at Manila Bay and Santiago, Cuba, during the Spanish-American
War, historian Ronald Andidora submits that the “small size of these engage-
ments and the disproportionate material advantage enjoyed by the Americans in
each of them rendered their instructional value almost nil.”4
But in fact the basic tenets of operational leadership and operational art are
timeless. Napoleon, Foch, and Spruance—and Mahan too—are indeed worthy of
study by today’s students of warfare, and so is Dewey. Dewey’s operational leader-
ship and his practice of operational art are relevant to twenty-first-century practi-
tioners of the operational level of war. In making this argument, this article details
how America’s first “Admiral of the Navy”—in effect, its first fleet admiral—won
the battle of Manila Bay before the first round was fired, by carefully incorporat-
ing into his campaign planning the operational functions of intelligence, com-
mand and control, logistics, and protection so as to mitigate adverse circumstances
related to the operational factors of time, space, and force.
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
At 5:41 AM on 1 May 1898, sixty-year-old Commodore George Dewey cemented
his place in history books with his famous command to the captain of his flag-
ship, the protected cruiser USS Olympia (C-6): “You may fire when you are
ready, Gridley.”5 Over the next seven hours, the American line of battle made five
firing runs past the numerically superior Spanish squadron, commanded by
Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo and riding at anchor in Manila Bay beneath the
cover of heavy shore-based batteries. Suffering 381 dead and the destruction of
most of his fleet, Montojo had little choice but to surrender to Dewey’s virtually
undamaged force, handing America what amounted to total victory.6 While the
events of 1 May 1898 were unquestionably decisive, the American victory had
been for all practical purposes assured before Dewey and his squadron steamed
into Manila Bay. As Dewey observed shortly after his victory, “This battle was
won in Hong Kong Harbor.”7
Early that year, on 3 January, with the specter of war with Spain over alleged
Spanish atrocities in Cuba looming, Commodore Dewey had assumed com-
mand of the Asiatic Squadron in a ceremony on board Olympia at Nagasaki, Ja-
pan. While the six-ship squadron under Dewey’s command was small compared
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to the fleets later amassed during World War II, it was a sizable and formidable
naval force for the day, especially for a U.S. Navy that was only now expanding
following a considerable downsizing in the decades following the Civil War.8
Dewey, after the required diplomatic proprieties with his Japanese hosts, or-
dered his squadron on 11 February to make for Hong Kong, having received no
direction from higher authority to do so but realizing that it would put his force
in the most advantageous position from which to mount an offensive against the
Spanish fleet.9 Upon the squadron’s arrival at Hong Kong on 17 February, he was
greeted with news of the sinking of the USS Maine only two days prior in Havana
Harbor, nearly halfway around the world. In the relative safety of Hong Kong’s
neutral harbor, Dewey wasted no time preparing for war with a fading but still
dangerous colonial power.
First and foremost, Dewey was facing enormous logistical challenges associ-
ated with the operational factor of space. Various plans for war with Spain drafted
in the 1890s called for the U.S. Asiatic Squadron to seek out and destroy the Span-
ish navy in the Spanish Philippines.10 Adopting these general plans, Dewey real-
ized his force would be operating more than seven thousand miles from his
nearest base, which meant it would take nearly two months to transport coal,
ammunition, and reserves into the theater. He also realized that a formal decla-
ration of war by the United States would render neutral ports, including Hong
Kong and all ports in Japan, off-limits in accordance with international law, in-
creasing his logistical concerns by compressing the operational factor of time.
Dewey had to make all preparations he could while in Hong Kong, a task compli-
cated by the fact that his every move was readily observable to the civilian vessels
and foreign warships plying the harbor.11
Of equal concern to Dewey was that the Spanish navy would be fighting in its
own waters and within easy range of numerous, heavily fortified Spanish bases. In
contrast, shortly after his appointment to the Asiatic Squadron, Dewey became
painfully aware of the inadequacy of U.S. intelligence on the region when his re-
quest for information about the Philippines was answered with a sorely outdated
1876 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence.12 The Office of Naval Intelli-
gence was certainly not alone in being unprepared for war in the Philippines. Prior
to the sinking of Maine, even President William McKinley confessed, “I could not
have told where those darned islands were within 2,000 miles.”13
Dewey’s challenges in the operational factors of space and time were exacer-
bated by yet others concerning the factor of force. Many historians have argued
that Dewey commanded a fleet that was, in nearly every aspect, vastly superior to
Montojo’s. Dewey’s autobiography acknowledges that he perceived a distinct
advantage in armament over his Spanish adversaries, mounting as he did fifty-
three “large guns” (above four inches) to thirty-one for the Spanish.14 A critical
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deficiency faced by Dewey, however, was in the quantity of vessels available. Al-
though Dewey’s force of six combatants was slightly less than Montojo’s seven,
the Spanish had more than twenty-five small gunboats that could mount a seri-
ous threat if brought into action.15 Furthermore, rumors circulated in Hong
Kong regarding the impregnability of Spanish shore defenses at Manila, a formi-
dable arsenal of more than 225 guns, many of heavy caliber.16 In all, prospects for
victory looked grim for Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron; the exclusive Hong Kong
Club offered heavy betting odds against the Americans.17 Only days before war
was formally declared, British officers of the Royal Navy entertained their Amer-
ican guests with a sort of farewell party. When it concluded, a British officer
commented, “What a very fine set of fellows. But unhappily, we shall never see
them again.”18
DEWEY’S GROWTH INTO AN OPERATIONAL LEADER
The manner in which Dewey proceeded in preparing for battle despite poor
odds and considerable difficulties attests to his qualities and effectiveness as an
operational leader. Milan Vego, a modern scholar of the history and practice of
operational art, contends, “The principal requirements for a successful opera-
tional leader are high intellect, strong personality, courage, boldness, and will to
act, combined with extensive professional knowledge and experience.”19 All of
these traits, as well as others, applied in various degrees to Dewey. His boldness
and experience, however, were the primary influences on his planning and exe-
cution at Manila Bay.
By the time he was appointed to command of the Asiatic Squadron, Dewey
was already renowned for his boldness. When his prestigious appointment pro-
duced outspoken criticism by some who favored other officers, Secretary of the
Navy Theodore Roosevelt was undeterred. Addressing a protesting delegation of
California congressmen, Roosevelt declared, “Gentlemen, I can’t agree with you.
We have looked up his record. We have looked him straight in the eyes. He is a
fighter. We’ll not change now.”20
Dewey’s boldness had emerged from experience. Within three years of his
graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1858, Dewey was assigned to the
side-wheel steam frigate USS Mississippi. When the American Civil War broke out,
Mississippi was assigned to the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, commanded by
David Glasgow Farragut. Dewey’s first engagement was Farragut’s attack on New
Orleans, just one of several successful and high-profile endeavors that were to dis-
tinguish Farragut as an aggressive and bold commander. Though not assigned to
Farragut’s flagship, USS Hartford, Dewey was able to observe Farragut’s leadership
style closely and quickly became a “disciple.” One of Farragut’s tactics, employed
to considerable effectiveness at New Orleans, was to pass heavily fortified shore
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positions at night. This experience would prove pivotal to Dewey at Manila Bay.
Following the capture of New Orleans, Dewey learned from Farragut another
lasting lesson, this time on initiative. After weeks of trying, a Confederate gun-
boat slipped passed the Union blockade, prompting Farragut to assemble his
commanding officers and others on board Hartford. Dewey, by then Mississippi’s
executive officer, attended. After all the officers were seated, Farragut demanded
an explanation of how the gunboat had snuck by. A junior officer from another
ship, who had been officer of the deck the night the incident occurred, spoke
out, admitting, “I could have rammed her, sir, only I was awaiting orders.”
Farragut, visibly disgusted, replied quietly, “Young man, you had the opportu-
nity to make a great name for yourself in your profession, but you missed it. I
doubt that you will get another.”21 Dewey would not miss his own opportunity
when the time came.
Some two years after his success at New Orleans, Farragut led a similarly bold
attack on Mobile, Alabama. As Farragut’s ships proceeded up the channel be-
tween Forts Gaines and Morgan, USS Tecumseh hit a mine (referred to during
that period as a “torpedo”) and sank almost immediately. Behind Tecumseh, USS
Brooklyn stopped in the channel and backed its engines, prompting Farragut to
yell down from his position in the rigging of Hartford, “What’s the trouble?”
When the reply from Brooklyn came back, “Torpedoes!” Farragut abruptly and
famously issued what would become his signature command: “Damn the torpe-
does! Go ahead!”22 Although Dewey was not present at the battle of Mobile Bay,
there is no doubt he was deeply impressed by reports of Farragut’s intrepidity in
the face of the enemy.
In his autobiography Dewey admitted, “Farragut has always been my ideal of
the naval officer: urbane, decisive, indomitable. Whenever I have been in a diffi-
cult situation, or in the midst of such confusion of details that the simple and
right thing to do seemed hazy, I have often asked myself, ‘What would Farragut
do?’ In the course of the preparations for Manila Bay I often asked myself this
question.”23 Unsurprisingly, his response would be very Farragut-like.
DEWEY’S CAMPAIGN PLAN
Having distinguished himself as a bold leader during his Civil War service,
Dewey would now distinguish himself as a well prepared commander. His prep-
arations for war with Spain commenced even before he arrived in Nagasaki to
take command of the Asiatic Squadron. Receiving notification of his pending
appointment while serving as the president of the Board of Inspection and Sur-
vey in Washington, Dewey immediately and exhaustively studied charts on the
Far East, placing particular emphasis on the Philippines.24 Keenly attuned to the
challenges of sustainment inherent in operating so far from his closest base, he
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undertook an investigation into the readiness of the ships assigned to his pro-
spective squadron.
His findings were disturbing: not one ship had even a full peacetime allow-
ance for ammunition and powder, let alone a wartime allowance.25 Upon being
informed by the Department of the Navy that merchant steamers would not
transport ammunition, due to safety concerns, Dewey worked with Roosevelt to
have additional ammunition shipped via the USS Concord, outfitting at Mare Is-
land, near Oakland, California, for service with the Asiatic Squadron.26 Demon-
strating exceptional foresight and resourcefulness, he stopped by Mare Island on
his journey west, calling on the commanding officer of Concord to persuade him
to minimize all supplies save his squadron’s badly needed ammunition, maxi-
mizing every inch of storage capacity for that purpose.27 Additionally, Dewey
recommended revising Concord’s track across the Pacific to include a brief stop
for coal in Hawaii, allowing the ship to make it to Japan, where additional stores
could be easily procured.28 Realizing that Concord was too small to carry more
than half the required ammunition, Dewey arranged for the sloop of war USS
Mohican to transport the balance. The speed in which these logistical arrange-
ments were made was critical: Mohican arrived in Hong Kong only forty-eight
hours before Dewey took his squadron to sea en route to Manila Bay.29
Dewey’s other chief logistical concern while at Hong Kong was coal. Dewey was
well aware that with the news of Maine’s sinking at Havana, war with Spain was
imminent. Faced with the inevitable prospect of then being directed by the British
authorities to depart Hong Kong and having no American bases available, Dewey
undertook discreet negotiations to purchase merchant colliers to provide floating
support. Obtaining Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long’s approval, Dewey pur-
chased the British merchant ships Nanshan and Zafiro and obtained the revenue
cutter McCulloch. Dewey, however, disobeyed Long’s orders to arm these newly
acquired auxiliaries, choosing instead, rather ingeniously, to register them as
American merchants cleared for Guam, in 1898 an exceedingly remote island that
Dewey regarded as an “almost mythical country.”30 Additionally, he elected to hire
the British crews and leave them intact, augmenting them with only small contin-
gents of U.S. Navy personnel. His efforts ensured that these vital support vessels
would not be ordered to leave the safety of Hong Kong upon the official declara-
tion of war, as well as their freedom to resupply in Japanese and Chinese ports.31
Another critical consideration for Dewey was the operational movement of
his forces. With fully half of his ships then considerable distances from Hong
Kong (USS Petrel was in the Bering Sea on fishery-protection service), Dewey
had to assemble them rapidly for redistribution of ammunition, bunkering, tac-
tical planning, dry docking for structural repairs, repainting of ships (grey, from
peacetime white), and the countless other preparations required for battle.32
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Effective use of transoceanic telegraph cables brought about the expeditious ar-
rival of all his warships at Hong Kong, though USS Baltimore arrived from Ho-
nolulu only on 22 April, two days before the governor of neutral Hong Kong
requested the withdrawal of all American ships.33
Even while collecting his force in Hong Kong, Dewey had embarked on an in-
telligence campaign to assist him in devising his plans for war. On 23 April,
Dewey sent a coded cablegram to O. F. Williams, the U.S. consul at Manila, re-
questing information on Manila’s defenses, the presence of mines, and Spanish
fleet movements.34 Despite a very real threat to his safety from the Spanish au-
thorities, Williams responded with a report of the mounting of six new, heavy
guns at Corregidor, the laying of mines in Manila Bay, the disposition of Spanish
surface forces, and efforts to fortify land positions.35 Furthermore, Williams re-
layed rumors from the streets of Manila detailing the organization of a coalition
European naval force being sent to defeat the Americans.36 Dewey also used his
own officers to gather intelligence, sending them ashore in Hong Kong disguised
as tourists or businessmen to obtain information from steamers arriving from
the Philippines. Through this method, Dewey heard of a policy requiring ships
entering the Corregidor channel to use Spanish pilots because of heavy min-
ing.37 Having acquired knowledge of the currents and water depths in Subic and
Manila Bays, Dewey deduced that extensive mining of the channels into either
port would be problematic for the Spanish and that the countless reports of
mines were nothing more than a ruse to deter attack.38 Through his deliberate
analysis of the information collected through this combination of highly re-
sourceful, if amateur, intelligence-gathering methods, Dewey obtained a sur-
prisingly accurate picture of what awaited him in Manila. In a cable to Secretary
Long sent on 31 March, fully a month before the battle of Manila Bay, Dewey
outlined with remarkable precision the Spanish naval and land forces at Manila,
concluding with confidence that he could take Manila in a single day.39
Enabled by his productive intelligence campaign, Dewey now set out to final-
ize his battle plans. According to modern U.S. joint doctrine, the preparation of
battle plans is one of several tasks encompassed by the command-and-control
function, along with communicating the status of information, assessing the sit-
uation, and commanding subordinate forces. If Dewey had learned boldness
during the Civil War, his planning was deliberate, thorough, and cautious.
Somewhat surprisingly, his planning process was very much a collaborative af-
fair, drawing extensively from the inputs of his subordinate commanders. “Day
after day, he summoned his captains to discuss all the possibilities and eventuali-
ties of a conflict with the enemy. He gave them an opportunity to say when,
where, and how the battle should be fought. From junior to senior he called
upon them to express their opinions freely. If any man had a novel idea, it was
G R A N G E R 1 3 3
7
Granger: Dewey at Manila Bay—Lessons in Operational Art and Operational Le
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
given careful consideration.”40 In assessing Dewey’s command and control prac-
tices, an officer serving under Dewey in the Philippines observed that Dewey
“had the respect and confidence of every officer and man who served under
him.” He added, “Prior to leaving Hong Kong, every contingency which might
arise was considered and studied, and plans made to meet each one, so that when
the time actually came to engage the enemy’s fleet, we had a prearranged plan
which fitted the case perfectly.”41
Despite the absence of an official proclamation of war by the United States,
the governor of Hong Kong sent word to Dewey on 24 April that British neutral-
ity necessitated the departure of all American ships within twenty-four hours.
Dewey did not bother to wait for the full twenty-four hours to elapse, for by that
time he had essentially completed combat preparations and the bold plan that
would be executed to near perfection less than a week later.
Having closely studied China, Dewey correctly surmised that so loosely orga-
nized a nation as it then was would be unable to enforce neutrality laws. That
consideration prompted him to steam his squadron from Hong Kong to Mirs
Bay, an anchorage in Chinese territory thirty miles from Hong Kong.42 There he
meticulously oversaw final preparations, including such details as jettisoning
decorative woodwork from all of his ships to reduce the threat of splinters and
fire and draping chains over the sides of the ships to serve, to some degree, as ar-
mor.43 Additionally, he relentlessly drilled his forces in critical skills like target
practice and damage control, as well as in skills less likely to be needed, like hand-
to-hand combat.
In the midst of all of the activity, on the morning of 27 April, a small tug en-
tered Mirs Bay to deliver an urgent cablegram from Secretary Long: “War has
commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine
Islands. Commence operations, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must
capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.”44 At once, Dewey summoned
all commanding officers for a final meeting on board Olympia to discuss the lat-
est intelligence on Manila and Subic Bays and promulgate what would now be
called his “commander’s guidance.” Less than three hours after receiving Secre-
tary Long’s cable, the Asiatic Squadron steamed from Mirs Bay to seek out the
Spanish fleet some six hundred miles away. Dewey had little chance of achieving
the element of surprise, however, as the Spanish consul at Hong Kong informed
Montojo by cable that “the enemy’s squadron sailed at 2 PM from the Bay of Mirs,
and according to reliable accounts they sailed for Subic Bay to destroy our squad-
ron and then will go to Manila.”45 That is precisely what Dewey did, arriving first
at Subic and dispatching two vessels to reconnoiter for the Spanish fleet before
continuing on to Manila Bay, reaching it in the early morning of 1 May 1898.
1 3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Mahanian doctrine presumably led Dewey to consider the Spanish fleet as the
enemy center of gravity. While he was confident that his own squadron’s morale,
training readiness, and superior projectile weight would give him a decided ad-
vantage over the Spanish fleet, he had serious concerns regarding the heavy
shore batteries overlooking the approaches to Manila Bay. Dewey observed in
his autobiography, “If the guns commanding the entrance were well served,
there was danger of damage to my squadron before it engaged the enemy’s
squadron.”46 Through his experience at the Board of Inspection and Survey and
his study of Mahanian doctrine, he was fully aware of the effectiveness of mod-
ern guns when fired from a stationary position and of the legitimacy of Mahan’s
maxim that one shore-based gun was the equal of four guns of similar caliber
afloat.47 Accordingly, his plan focused heavily on operational protection and
passive defensive measures intended to neutralize this critical Spanish strength.
First, Dewey decided to enter Manila Bay through Boca Grande, the wider of the
two entrances, to maximize the separation between his squadron and the batter-
ies.48 Second, Dewey planned to complicate targeting by entering the bay at
night, with all navigation lights extinguished.49 As a result, despite Montojo’s ex-
cellent intelligence on the movement of the American squadron and the advan-
tageous positions of his powerful shore batteries, the Spanish failed to engage
the U.S. ships until they were very nearly inside Manila Bay, even then firing only a
couple of rounds, with no effect. The Americans returned fire with a few rounds
of their own, but Dewey had made it clear to his commanding officers that the
squadron would not stop to fight it out with the shore batteries but would remain
focused on the objective—the Spanish fleet.50 Safely past the shore batteries and
seeing no threat of the rumored Spanish mines, the American squadron had now
only to wait for the sun and seek out and destroy the Spanish fleet, a task that it
carried out with little difficulty and no loss of American life.
DEWEY USHERS IN AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
When the Spanish-American War began, the strategic American objective was to
liberate Cuba from alleged Spanish atrocities, not to gain colonial possessions.51
That objective decisively shifted three days after the defeat of the Spanish Pacific
fleet, when Dewey cabled to Secretary Long, “We control bay completely and can
take city at any time, but have not sufficient men to hold.”52 The prospect of seizing
territory had not been seriously considered by the McKinley administration, but
Dewey’s cable prompted the mobilization of additional forces to do just that. Two
significant challenges faced Dewey. First, the Filipinos were mounting an insur-
gency against the Spanish forces occupying the countryside around Manila. Sec-
ond, ships of the powerful German navy were conspicuously patrolling the waters
adjacent to Manila Bay, threatening to claim the Philippines for their nation.53
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Almost immediately following Montojo’s defeat, Spanish general Don Basilio,
realizing the hopelessness of his situation, had communicated through intermedi-
aries his willingness to surrender his thirty-one thousand troops to Dewey’s
squadron.54 Dewey was unwilling to accept the offer, fearful that his lack of suffi-
cient occupation forces would prompt looting and widespread bloodshed of
Spaniards at the hands of the Filipino insurgents. Accordingly, he waited for
American expeditionary troops under the command of Major General Wesley
Merritt, U.S. Army, to arrive.
Even as Dewey was declining the offer of Spanish surrender, exiled Filipino
leader Emilio Aguinaldo arrived in Manila Bay seeking to create a native, inde-
pendent government under American advisers.55 Realizing that the growing
number of native insurgents could be of assistance in pushing the Spanish forces
from their garrison into the city of Manila, Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by allow-
ing the insurgents the use of captured Spanish guns and ammunition; he was
careful, however, not to forge an alliance that might imply recognition of a Fili-
pino state.56 Unhindered by Dewey, a band of a thousand Filipino insurgents
drove the nearly thirteen thousand Spaniards from their garrison on 29 May,
forcing their withdrawal to Manila. Emboldened by his success, Aguinaldo now
proclaimed establishment of the “First Republic of the Philippines,” with himself
as dictator. Dewey, despite his delicate and conditional support of Aguinaldo,
faced a major problem: three separate authorities were now attempting to exercise
rule over the Philippines.57
When Merritt arrived with 8,500 troops in early August, Dewey continued his
negotiations for a Spanish surrender. He eventually obtained an agreement with
Don Basilio’s successor, General Firmin Jaudenes, that Spanish forces would sur-
render, provided they faced an American assault—Jaudenes’s “honor demanded
that.” As Dewey later recalled, “So I had to fire, to kill a few people.”58 The agree-
ment thus made, Dewey and Merritt carried out what amounted to a staged joint
attack from land and sea on 10 August, prompting a swift Spanish surrender. With
the Spaniards out of the power struggle, the Americans would shift their focus to
Aguinaldo and embark on a counterinsurgency campaign that would ultimately
prove lengthy, costly, and bloody. Recognizing that a counterinsurgency campaign
required professional diplomacy as well as military might, Dewey wrote his friend,
Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont, “This appears to me an occasion for the tri-
umph of statesmanship rather than of arms.”59
To prevent the Germans from clawing their way into the power vacuum,
Dewey established a naval blockade of Manila Bay. Despite initially having far
fewer ships than the Germans would ultimately operate in the region, the Amer-
icans enforced the blockade with an aggressiveness that prompted cooperation
from most foreign naval vessels. Numerous situations developed between
1 3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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American and German warships that risked open conflict, but Dewey repeatedly
distinguished himself as a highly effective diplomat, balancing resolve with deli-
cacy, projecting strength without heavy-handedness.60
If Dewey’s skillful diplomacy with the Japanese, Germans, Spaniards, British,
and Filipinos is somewhat surprising in view of his reputation for boldness, so
too was his perception of the importance of what are now known as “informa-
tion operations” during an age that gave rise to muckraking and “yellow jour-
nalism.” John Barrett, a newspaper correspondent who was embarked on board
Olympia from May 1898 to March 1899, later described Dewey as lenient in his
press censorship, adding that nobody “could rival the Admiral in quick percep-
tion of what was permissible news and what was not, together with the rare fac-
ulty of showing the correspondent with unfailing urbanity why this or that
sentence should be changed or omitted.”61 An example of his keen awareness of
the value of public perception occurred during preparations for the joint staged
attack on Manila. After reviewing a proposed release that referred to the pending
“bombardment” of the city, Dewey recommended instead the phrase “reduce
the defenses of the city.” He explained, “It is necessary for us to remember that
we are making history. If we left in words which implied no respect for noncom-
batants, women and children and property, we would be censured for it by the
future historian.”62
DEWEY’S RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The term “operational art”—the theory and practice of preparing for and con-
ducting military operations on land, at sea, and in the air—was coined by the
Russians in the 1920s, more than two decades after Dewey’s victory at Manila
Bay.63 Nonetheless, there is little argument that Dewey essentially practiced op-
erational art in the design of his campaign plan in the western Pacific. What
makes Dewey’s success relevant today is not his textbook use of Mahanian tac-
tics but his careful and deliberate crafting of a battle plan that mitigated sizable
deficiencies in the operational factors of space, force, and time. Several recent
conflicts have shown that Dewey’s approach remains prudent.
Take, for example, Dewey’s resourcefulness in combating his logistical diffi-
culties and lack of cargo-lift capacity. Faced with similar problems preparing for
the Falklands War of 1982, the British did exactly as Dewey did, chartering
containerships, commercial tankers, and cruise liners to transport cargo, fuel,
and troops eight thousand miles from the United Kingdom to the Falklands the-
ater.64 Furthermore, the British decision to leave behind wheeled vehicles to
maximize loading space for tracked vehicles echoes of Dewey’s efforts to sacri-
fice less critical supplies for vital ammunition on board Concord.65
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Vego observes, “Intelligence should provide the operational commander
timely, accurate, and relevant information about the enemy forces’ order of battle
. . . and capabilities, and the enemy’s critical strengths and weaknesses.”66 Dewey’s
energetic “intelligence preparation of the battlefield,” though he had practically
no professional intelligence resources, paved the way for his success. Of particular
importance was Dewey’s careful consideration of rumors of mines, and his ulti-
mate (and correct) dismissal of them as a ruse. The failure to ascertain enemy ca-
pabilities accurately, despite vastly superior intelligence capabilities than Dewey
enjoyed, has proved disastrous to many modern commanders. Dewey, dissecting
the Spanish disinformation campaign and comprehensively war- gaming every
potential Spanish course of action, avoided falling into the trap of postponing his
attack due to overestimating the strength of his enemy. In essence, Dewey knew
his enemy and knew when to press the issue to preclude the Spaniards from rein-
forcing or further constructing shore defenses.
A 13 August 2010 New York Times article observed, “Mastery of battlefield
tactics and a knack for leadership are only prerequisites. Generals and other top
officers are now expected to be city managers, cultural ambassadors, public rela-
tions whizzes and politicians as they deal with multiple missions and constitu-
encies in the war zone, in allied capitals—and at home.”67 Dewey, it appears, was
ahead of his time. His astute media awareness, coupled with the delicacy with
which he handled myriad political and cultural sensitivities, should serve as an
example for modern-day military leaders facing an increasingly complex secu-
rity environment in an age of globalism.
Perhaps most important, modern students should seriously question
Andidora’s assertion that Dewey’s material advantages in age and capability of
his ships somehow guaranteed success at Manila Bay. History is rife with exam-
ples of superior forces falling to inferior ones. The American Revolutionary War,
the Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941, and Midway in 1942 were all “under-
dog” victories. Advantages in the operational factor of force have often been off-
set by the hubris of reliance on sheer numbers or technology rather than careful
and deliberate planning to identify and exploit weaknesses. Vego argues, “Expe-
rience shows that no new technologies, no matter how advanced, can replace
operational art,” adding that “the excessive focus on tactics of platforms and
weapons/sensors reduces all fighting to simple targeting and shooting.”68
Dewey’s careful application of operational art despite material advantages
over his adversaries ensured that his forces remained focused on the enemy’s
center of gravity while offsetting Spanish critical strengths.
Finally, Dewey’s performance as an operational leader is worthy of careful con-
sideration. The 2010 U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operating Environment
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observes, “Those commanders who have listened and absorbed what their sub-
ordinates had to say were those who recognized what was actually happening in
combat, because they had acculturated themselves to learning from the experi-
ences of others.”69 Dewey’s collaborative approach to planning for war, an ap-
proach that drew heavily from the inputs of his subordinates, supports this
observation. A collective MIT, Carnegie Mellon, and Union College research ef-
fort yielded a 2010 report that concluded, among other things, “In groups where
one person dominated, the group was less collectively intelligent than in groups
where the conversational turns were more evenly distributed.”70 Arguably,
Dewey’s willingness to participate in, rather than dominate, planning, notwith-
standing his positional authority and bold predisposition, was the critical
enabler of his success. With the adoption of the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower and its underlying emphasis on international partner-
ship and shared responsibility, that quality is becoming increasingly important.
There can be no mistaking that experience matters in the development of our
military leaders. Dewey’s experience, particularly his participation in the Amer-
ican Civil War, provided him with real-world tactical expertise as well as a highly
successful role model to emulate. The forging of similar leaders in that way in to-
day’s Navy is problematic due to the dearth of naval conflicts since the conclu-
sion of World War II. This reality underscores the importance of “providing the
education so that future leaders can understand the political, strategic, histori-
cal, and cultural framework of a more complex world, as well as possess a thor-
ough grounding in the nature of war, past, present, and future.”71 Accordingly,
future leaders in the U.S. Navy must continue studying historical applications of
operational art. In doing so, they would be wise not to overlook Dewey.
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